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The intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when 
the	facts	became	incontrovertible,	when	it	was	forbidden	to	say	that	the	
emperor had no clothes.
-Michel Foucault
Abstract
Do paradigms in social science shift as swiftly as do many in natural 
science? This article surveys the evolution of economics as an example 
of how paradigms shift and interact in social science. Through com-
parative historical analysis of economic theories, psychoanalysis, and 
theoretical reflection, it submits that academic progress in social scien-
ce has normative underpinnings that interfere with paradigm shifts. 
We coin the term “Sticky Paradigms” to explain the combination of 
emotional normative framework and reason. This paper will first con-
duct a review of different schools of thoughts in economics to examine 
if its intellectual history fits the standard of paradigm shifts. Second, 
we analyze how emotion and reason can work together to produce 
intellectualism. Third, we elaborate our conceptualization of “Sticky 
Paradigms”. We conclude with a discussion on the Hegelian dialectic, 
treating paradigms as competing myths rather than a pragmatic theo-
retical competition. 
Key words
Paradigm Shift, Sticky Paradigms, Economics, Emotions, Hegelian 
Dialectic. 
Resumen 
Existen más cambios constantes y marcados en fragmentos cortos de 
tiempo en las Ciencias Sociales que en las Ciencias Naturales?  En este 
artículo se examina la evolución de la economía, ejemplificando cómo 
los paradigmas cambian e interactúan en las Ciencias Sociales. A tra-
vés del análisis histórico comparativo de las teorías económicas, el psi-
coanálisis y la reflexión teórica, se sostiene que el progreso académico 
en las Ciencias Sociales tiene fundamentos normativos que interfieren 
con los cambios de paradigma. Con ello, se atribuye el término “Sticky 
Paradigms” para explicar la combinación del marco normativo emo-
cional y la razón. Es como este documento pretende realizar en primer 
lugar una revisión de las diferentes escuelas de pensamiento en econo-
mía, con el fin de examinar si su historia intelectual se ajusta a la norma 
de los cambios de paradigma. En segundo lugar, se analiza cómo la 
emoción y la razón pueden trabajar conjuntamente para producir el 
intelectualismo. En tercer lugar, se elabora una conceptualización de 
“Sticky Paradigms”. Y por último, se concluye con una discusión sobre 
la dialéctica hegeliana, y el tratamiento de los paradigmas como mitos 
que concurren en un concurso teórico pragmático.
Palabras Claves 
Cambio de paradigma, paradigmas reiterados, economía, emociones, 
dialéctica hegeliana 
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Introduction
A paradigm embodies theories, principles and research topics as a set of practices dominant in a discipline. Do paradigms shift? Specifica-
lly, do paradigms in the social sciences shift as swiftly as do many in the 
natural sciences? In physics, for example, Einsteinian relativity replaced 
Newtonian physics in the early 20th century, resulting in a rapid trans-
formation of worldview in the discipline. In social science, how do we 
characterize the relationship between succeeding or competing paradig-
ms? Which factors account for possible paradigmatic structures in social 
science? We hypothesize that emotional attachments frustrate smooth and 
rapid paradigm shifts within social science as academics have normative 
underpinnings, defined by emotion, that interfere with their work. From 
this, we argue that intellectualism in social science is the product of both 
emotional normative frameworks and reason. More specifically, in a psy-
choanalytic sense, the ego of the intellectual plays a role in a paradigm’s 
longevity. Being dominant over other competitors brings pleasure to some 
and pain to others, causing a digging in of perspectives. This is because 
of the defense mechanisms that are manufactured by the ego, deep within 
the intellectuals’ psyche. These two features create sticky paradigms, and 
does not facilitate in the ease of shifts. In order to explain such a complex 
phenomenon as society and human relations in social science, influential 
intellectual ideas translate into defining paradigms that coexist with, com-
pete with, and sometimes complement each other. 
A branch of social science, economics is “the science which studies human 
behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alter-
native uses”.1 In recent decades, economic reasoning has been increasing-
ly applied to study and research of other social science disciplines such as 
political science, history, and psychology. Its expanding terrain has earned 
economics an important place in social science. Hence, this article attempts 
to account for paradigmatic structure in economics, so as to understand the 
more general patterns of continuity and changes in social science. 
Two authoritative economists, John Maynard Keynes and Fredrick Au-
gust Hayek both had emotion, particularly fear as a main motivator that 
caused them to create their respective works. A close reading of Keynes 
1  Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1932), 16.
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and Hayek and other academics demonstrate their normative bias, for ex-
ample, Keynes: to save capitalism from its booms and busts, and Hayek: 
to save the Western world from authoritarianism.   
This paper will discuss four main ideas. First, via comparative histori-
cal analysis of economic theories, we examine if the intellectual histo-
ry fits the standard of paradigm shifts. Second, through psychoanaly-
sis, we analyze how emotion and reason can work together to produce 
an idea. Following this, we deliberate on Sticky Paradigms, that is, the 
persistence of old paradigms in the face of new ideas. Fourth, we shall 
conclude with a theoretical reflection on the Hegelian dialectic, treating 
paradigms as competing myths rather than a pragmatic competition. 
Throughout our analysis, we also use empirical evidence from the recent 
2008 global economic meltdown to illustrate the case of sticky para-
digms. Ultimately, intellectualism cannot be considered as an autono-
mous exercise, divorced from emotion. Rather, it is subordinated and 
embedded in emotion. This article will therefore attempt to make sense 
of the multiplicity of paradigms that enrich social science, and serve as 
a starting point for future discussion. 
The Structure of Paradigm Shifts
Essentially, the research question goes as follows: can we observe a 
clear-cut and swift pattern of paradigm shift, with regard to the evolu-
tionary history of dominant/influential theories in economics? In this 
part, we will discuss some scholarly opinions on paradigm shift and 
offer empirics from the discipline of Economics, and International Po-
litical Economy to a lesser extent.  
Thomas Kuhn is the most heard proponent of the original hypothesis that 
there should be an easily-distinguished line between paradigms in the in-
tellectual history of normal science. When examining how normal sci-
ence has evolved from “myths” to various science disciplines, Kuhn based 
his analysis upon the principles of logical positivism. Kuhn’s model of sci-
entific change differs here, a nd in many places, from that of the logical 
positivists, in that it places an enhanced emphasis on the individual hu-
mans involved as scientists, rather than abstracting science into a purely 
logical or philosophical venture. Specifically, while discussing scientific 
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development with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Ein-
stein, Kuhn states:
Each of these (scientific revolutions) necessitated the community’s 
rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another 
with which it was incompatible. Each produced a consequent shift 
in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards 
by which the profession determined what should count as an ad-
missible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each 
transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultima-
tely need to describe as a transformation of the world within which 
scientific work was done2.
Kuhn defines a scientific revolution that facilitates paradigm shift as “suf-
ficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away 
from competing modes of scientific activity”.3 Thus, we can see that a par-
adigm shift from Kuhn’s perspective is a breakthrough that is in resem-
blance with a radical revolution. Similar to Darwin’s natural selection and 
against relativism, Kuhn considers a new paradigm to be always better 
than, and not just different from the old one. Any scientists who choose 
to go along with the old paradigm will be washed out of fashion quickly.  
Paradigms are imperfect, but imperfection is a necessary evil. The enter-
prise of constituting a paradigm is “an attempt to force nature into the 
preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies… 
those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all”.4 In other words, 
that could be an inevitable “selection error” problem in the process of par-
adigm building, and limitations of agreement left many fascinating theo-
retical problems for successors to improve the match between paradigm 
and observation of the real world, constituting a post-paradigm period.5  
2  Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), 6. 
3  Thomas, The Structure, 10.  
4  Thomas, The	Structure, 24. 
5  According to Kuhn: “The enterprise now under discussion has drastically restricted 
vision. But those restrictions, born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be essen-
tial to the development of science. By focusing attention upon a small range of relatively 
esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a 
detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable. And normal science possesses 
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It is these imperfections embodied in the confines of possible research 
questions in a particular paradigm that trigger a paradigm shift. Kuhn 
traces the root of a paradigm shift to the lack of novelties in an established 
science: “Normal science does not aim at novelties of facts or theory and, 
when successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, how-
ever, repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories 
have again and again been invented by scientists”.6 Therefore, rejection 
of one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept anoth-
er, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison 
of both paradigms with nature and with each other. Meanwhile, the pro-
cess is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals rather than a 
cumulative one because a scientific revolution should always be drastic 
enough to make sure that paradigmatic anomalies will penetrate existing 
knowledge to the core. Moreover, in describing the radical nature of a 
paradigm shift, Kuhn adds:
The new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation, emerg-
es all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man 
deeply immersed in crisis… Almost always the men who achieve these 
fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young 
or very new to the field whose paradigm they change.7
Overall, Kuhn is against the view of science as cumulation which is “en-
tangled with a dominant epistemology that takes knowledge to be a con-
struction placed directly upon raw sense date by the mind”, but argues 
that “cumulative acquisition of novelty is not only rare in fact but improb-
able in principle”.8 From this stance, a paradigm challenger must think 
outside the box that is defined and confined by the traditional paradigm, 
in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology.
a built-in mechanism that ensures the relaxation of the restrictions that bound research 
whenever the paradigm from which they derive ceases to function effectively. At that 
point scientists begin to behave differently, and the nature of their research problems 
changes. In the interim, however, during the period when the paradigm is successful, the 
profession will have solved problems that its members could scarcely have imagined and 
would never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm. And at least part of 
the achievement always proves to be permanent” (Ibid, 24-25)
6  Thomas, The Structure, 52. 
7  Thomas, The Structure, 89-90.
8  Thomas, The Structure, 96.
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If there should be a “scientific” mode of evolution of economic thoughts 
in accordance with Kuhn’s observation, we can draw a general picture of 
paradigm shifts within the field of economics. Originally, by focusing on 
nation-states and government’s “visible hand”, mercantilism or economic 
nationalism had dominated Europe and its colonies for over 250 years 
after the late Renaissance of the 15th century, until Adam Smith in 1776 
wrote that the wealth of a nation is increased by expanding the market 
production rather than accumulating gold reserves through exports. In 
showing so, Smith initiated the Smithsonian Revolution against mercan-
tilism in favor of classical economic liberalism. For over a century after 
the first industrial revolution of 1840, the law of market or Say’s law had 
dominated economics. Practiced and promoted by Jean Say, James Mill, 
David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mills, this early paradigm of econom-
ics was based on principles of laissez-faire, market self-regulation, and 
supply-side economic policies. Subsequently, Alfred Marshall in 1870s 
started the marginalist revolution based on the idea of marginal utility 
to construct the field of economics into a more scientific and objective 
discipline, as brought under the name of neoclassical economics. During 
the Great Depression of 1929 to 1933, John Maynard Keynes and his sup-
porters challenged the traditional view of market fundamentalism and 
supply-side economy and they facilitated the Keynesian revolution that 
raised a demand-side theory of employment and promoted government 
interventions as to maximize aggregate demand and countercyclical em-
ployment during economic stress. As Keynesianism waned due to its 
inability to prevent rampant debt crises in the 1970s, the movement of 
monetarism arose to challenge the paradigmatic position of the former. 
Developed by Milton Friedman, monetarism refutes Keynesian defi-
cit spending, and aims to re-direct monetary policy toward controlling 
inflation and stabilizing money supply, instead of providing short-term 
employment and stimulating aggregate demand under Keynesianism. Per 
Kuhn, each successive paradigm should be better and represent a different 
worldview, with regard to substance, methods, problem-field, and stan-
dards of solution. 
However, the real picture is much messier than suggested above. Para-
digm changes have never been thoroughly distinct. Instead there has been 
a great deal of overlapping and repetition both academically and empir-
ically. There have been, in the academic history of economics, successful 
endeavors of working within the “old-fashioned” paradigm while the new 
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one has gained intellectual prevalence. In 1791—almost two decades after 
Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations (1776) signifying the birth of 
classical economic liberalism as the discipline’s new paradigm, American 
Founding Father Alexander Hamilton presented Report on the Subject of 
Manufacturers to American congress. With a strong mercantilist bent, the 
report laid forth economic principles for the “American System” that the 
newly independent republic should develop and protect its manufactur-
ing industry through tariffs, bounties, subsidies, and other government 
measures. His proposal gave birth to the famous argument of Infant In-
dustry Protection as a modern theory of economic nationalism. Devoted 
to making his nation a powerful and affluent one, Hamilton wrote:
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who have preoccu-
pied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formi-
dable obstacle, than either of those, which have been mentioned, to 
the introduction of the same branch into a country, in which it did 
not before exist. To maintain between the recent establishments of 
one country and the long matured establishments of another coun-
try, a competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, 
is in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the 
other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to forbid a 
successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and protection 
of government.9 
Hamilton’s affiliation with mercantilist practices was firmly based on his 
belief in European experience and its ability to create international com-
petitiveness. At a time when the Smithsonian revolution was sweeping 
Europe and the new continent and Smith’s liberal claims were publicly 
supported by other America’s founding fathers such as Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison, Alexander Hamilton’s ideas later formed the base of 
the American school of economics that had influenced American soci-
ety for over a century. In spite of the relative popularity of the neoclas-
sical paradigm, mercantilism did not simply fade out and a new view of 
the world did not dominate in the scientific community of economics as 
would be suggested by Kuhn.  
9  Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufacturers,” (1791): Part III 
Point 3 Paragraph 10. 
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In a similar light, while Keynesian economics of aggregate demand and 
government intervention became the new paradigm in the 1940s, Hayek’s 
works on defending classical liberalism did not become marginalized. 
Rather, his book The Road to Serfdom (1944) was well received through-
out academia then and is still very popular. Throughout the years when 
Keynesianism principles waxed and waned, Hayek continued his liberal-
ist program of constructing a free society through the invisible hand. In 
1945, Hayek wrote “The Use of Knowledge in Society” and argued against 
a central planning economy by saying that: “it (the price system) fulfills 
less perfectly as prices grow more rigid”.10 In 1976, Hayek wrote Denation-
alization of Money, advocating a free market in money as a solution to 
stop inflation and suggesting that “government should be deprived of its 
monopoly of the issue of money”.11 Later, this book was made the corner-
stone of the Austrian free banking school of the 20th century that aspires 
to limit the power of central banks and enlarge that of private commercial 
banks. As a productive economist, Hayek has undertaken various projects 
during his lifetime. All his works seemed to carry some sort of paradig-
matic coherence in that his research was always based on his firm position 
on classical liberalism. One step beyond, his research carried a human 
dimension, a combination of passion, life experiences, and courage to go 
against the tide. In the next section, we will synthesize these factors of 
human dimension as independent variables to explain the stickiness of 
paradigm and the impracticality of a paradigm shift in social science, es-
pecially, in economics.
Furthermore, through carefully examining the practical application of 
both Keynes’ and Hayek’s economic thoughts, we observe an iterative in-
stead of progressive pattern. For example, Keynes’ demand-side economic 
policy with a role for government (fiscal policy) and central bank (mone-
tary policy) was widely adopted in the late 1930s after The General Theory 
of	Employment,	Interest,	and	Money (1936). After major capitalist econo-
mies had implemented Keynesian macroeconomic policies of short-term 
aggregate demand to stimulate sufficient employment for three decades, 
Keynes’ legacy started to wane in the late 1960s as major economies ran 
10  F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic Review, 
Vol.35, No. 4 (September 1945): 526. 
11  F.A. Hayek, Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of 
Concurrent Currencies (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976), 13. 
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into stagflation and Latin American and African countries were bogged 
down in prolonged sovereign debt crises. Swiftly, it was from the 1970s 
when Hayek’s promotion of free market sprit and minimal government 
intervention gained a new lease of life: both traditional and emerging cap-
italist economies began to follow a neoliberal model that prescribes trade 
liberalization, privatization, macroeconomic prudence, and democratic 
capitalism. For example, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971, Hayek’s defense of a free banking system that allows for free compe-
tition among major currencies and for banks’ fractional reserves “coincid-
ed” with the emergence of the Jamaica Accords of 1976 that legitimized a 
floating exchange rate system and strengthened Special Drawing Rights at 
the International Monetary Fund.  
More recently, a parallel trend of paradigmatic applications in Interna-
tional Political Economy has emerged, during which competing schools 
thought have been employed simultaneously to explain the same event, 
be it financial crisis, development, international trade, or more broad-
ly, economic globalization. For instance, “international laissez-faire and 
revisionist Keynesianism”,12 per economists Razin and Rosefielde (2011) 
were twin causes of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. On the one hand, 
market fundamentalism and “laissez-faire” placed the government’s  em-
phasis on enhancing competitive efficiency, financial globalization, and 
trade liberalization. On the other hand, scholars of revisionist Keynes-
ianism, notably Phillips and Samuelson, have, since the 1950s, promoted 
a budget strategy that “full employment could only be maintained with 
‘excess’ monetary and/or fiscal stimulation accompanied by inflationary 
side-effects…(and) any deficit spending which benefited them (politi-
cians) and their constituents would stimulate aggregate economic activi-
ty and employment”.13 While international laissez-faire leads to a volatile 
and often fragile international market, revisionist Keynesianism has cre-
ated an incredible national debt for the United States and a too-big-to-fail 
mentality. In this case, both the Keynesian and the Hayekian “paradigms” 
possess a reasonable amount of explaining power and neither opinion is 
sufficient enough to account for the current complex state of affairs.  
12  Assaf Razin and Steven Rosefielde, “Currency and Financial Crises of the 1990’s and 
2000’s,” National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	Working	Paper	16754, (2011):597. 
13  Razin and Rosefielde, “Currency,” 513. 
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To conclude this section, we refute Kuhn’s ideas by arguing that a deter-
mined paradigm shift will not be the case in social science such as eco-
nomics. Instead, we find that paradigms are sticky! All in all, social science 
diverges from natural science in the former’s inherent tendency of value 
relevance and we ought to understand paradigms in social science in a 
more philosophical and humane way.14 In the next section, we attempt to 
construct a causal link between emotion (mainly fear) and the persistence 
of different economic paradigms. 
Fear as the X Factor: Economics, Reason and the 
Human Condition
It is commonly thought that reason and emotion are two parallel lines 
considered dichotomous since the time of Plato.15 In Phaedrus, Plato 
writes that reason is the horse that leads to salvation, whereas the road of 
emotion is one of lust and destruction. He created this seemingly true, yet 
false dichotomy as a learning tool, a mythos for conceptual purposes. In 
another work, Philebus, he continues this work albeit in a different fash-
ion. Here, emotion is perceived as a complement to reason.16 Both reason 
and emotion are two parts that compose the intellectual process. In this 
14  Academically, there are always prominent scholars producing remarkable works 
along the line of “obsolete” paradigms.  Empirically, different paradigms coexist to ex-
plain and provide remedies to the same socioeconomic event.  Maybe we can stop by 
asserting that diversity is beautiful but the reasoning of why paradigms are sticky should 
go much deeper than this.  Firstly, social science are qualitatively different from natural 
science.  Although both can advance by abstraction and generalization, Max Weber ar-
gued that differences between natural and social science lie in the cognitive intentions 
of the researcher and that social scientists make “value relevant” choices of the human 
actors and actions they wish to explore.  Also, based on the theory of empirical falsi-
fication, the great science philosopher Karl Popper adopted a “conjecturalism” stance 
against scientism that “all scientific knowledge is conjectural… due to an asymmetry be-
tween verification and falsification” (Artigas 1997, 5).  Popper was joined by his lifelong 
friend F.A. Hayek in the objection of scientism: “the danger is now the opposite one of 
the predominance of scientism impeding the progress of the understanding of society.” 
(Hayek 1952, 17).  The danger of scientism, per Hayek is thus to treat men mechanically. 
While criticizing neoclassical economics, John Kenneth Galbraith denoted “imitative 
scientism” to the mainstream economics and suggested a more blurry line between nor-
mative and positive economics.  
15  V J. McGill, Emotion and Reason (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954), xii.
16  McGill, Emotion, viii. 
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section, we will define these two faculties separately and discuss how they 
function together to define the competing paradigms that have come to 
explain modern economics. These very faculties make up our nature; it 
expresses humanity and the essence of our existence. 
Emotions are universal: human beings are linked by this metaphysical 
substance. They are a vital part of the human experience; inseparable 
from the human condition however varied the historical context.17 Emo-
tions can be defined as 
…a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective 
factors, mediated through neural and/or hormonal systems, which 
gives rise to feelings (affective experiences as of pleasure or displea-
sure) and also general cognitive processes toward appraising the ex-
perience; emotions in this sense lead to physiological adjustments 
to the conditions that aroused response, and often to expressive and 
adaptive behavior.18 
As human entities, due to the simple biological functioning of our bodies, 
we, our perception and our environment, are all products of our emotions. 
These emotions respond to a perceived understanding of a reality and will 
lead to behavior that individuals may not have control over. Fear of given 
societal problems, economic instability and its consequences for example, 
will lead to a response that may be calculated using reason and intellect. 
Fear is one of the many basic, fundamental emotions which forms the X 
favor seemingly ignored or superficially forgotten by Economics. From 
this definition, we understand that fear, an emotion, plays an important 
role in the decision-making process. It shapes intellectual pursuits and is 
a significant part of being human. 
In Politics, Aristotle argues that emotions are one of two variables needed 
to make sound moral, political decisions. He states: “…those who inves-
tigate politics must study the nature of the soul, in so far as the object of 
17  Goodwin, J, J.M Jasper, and F. Polleta. Passionate Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 10. 
18  Paul R. Kleinginna Jr., and Ann M. Kleinginna. “A Categorized List of Emotion 
Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition,” Motivation	and	Emotion,	5 
(1981):345. 
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his inquiry aids political understanding”.19 He creates the concept of sym-
phonia to describe the relationship between emotion and reason. Thus, 
an understanding of emotion is a prerequisite for an understanding of 
politics. 
Reason must also be explained to understand the role of emotion in the 
decision making process. Put simply, reason is the ability to think clearly 
to solve issues and achieve goals. This is linked to rationality which de-
notes achieving the best gains given limited means.20 This is an important 
assumption of Economics. In Economics, people are anticipated to be ra-
tional beings in that they make choices based on a ranked order of pref-
erences, calculating the costs and benefits of actions needed to achieve 
their goals. 
Interestingly, reason and rationality are used interchangeably in social 
science. However, they are meant to be qualitatively different concepts.21 
The term reason has been hijacked by rational choice theorists, their epis-
temology and methodology of choice. This erodes the actual meaning of 
the concept as one that attempts to solve issues using logic. Epistemologi-
cally, reason does not denote some objective truth separated from human 
interference; for there is nothing more human than feeling emotion.22,23 It 
is only assumed that the choices of our rational deliberations are human 
goals; the emotional aspect and the subject of investigation. However, 
such rational determination, for the sake of simplification, casts aside the 
emotional aspect that limits the range of choices available to the subject. 
The range of choices available is a product of the person’s emotional needs 
perceived as important to the subject in question. Using the two terms 
(reason and rationality) interchangeably erodes and confuses its actual 
meaning. Simplification that casts emotion aside for analytical purposes 
may have led to the dichotomization of emotion and reason, even when 
Aristotle meant them to be used in conjunction.  
19  Marlene K. Sokolon, Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and 
Emotion (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2006), 5. 
20  Sokolon, Political Emotions, 12. 
21  McGill, Emotion	and	Reason,	viii. 
22  McGill, Emotion and Reason, 9. 
23  Pascal said “the heart has its own reasons” meaning that emotions have rational 
motivations and goals.
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Together, it can be argued that reason and emotion work together “…in 
the process of judging external events and motivating human social and 
ethical action”.24,25 Aristotle himself combines the two in Nicomachean 
Ethics, referring to the temperate person as someone who has “his appe-
tites in symphony with his reason”.26 Ultimately, the intellectual consists of 
these two parts that combine to make him/her human; there is no escape 
from this fact, and no methodology can separate an academic from his/
her passion, motivation and reason for being. In this sense, we challenge 
academics to consider their emotion before and during their intellectual 
process. Emotions, especially fear, are key elements in determining our 
goals and objectives.
Many argue, erroneously, that Economics is an emotionless, positivist and 
amoral subject of inquiry. This could not be further from the truth. We 
submit that Economics is a field defined by normative and moral princi-
ples constructed by emotions, specifically fear as the X factor. Normative 
commitments are determined by an expressed need, driven by fear, to save 
the world from a perceived evil. The field of Economics best describes the 
articulated drive that designates an evil and advocates methods to protect 
and preserve society. This is best illustrated by the examining the norma-
tive beliefs and goals of the founders of Economics. Adam Smith began 
the scientific study of Economics but not without his normative roots. He 
wanted to see a society that could operate free from the heavy hand of 
government; that every man would have the freedom to conduct himself 
in his own self-interest. Karl Marx, another economist, albeit a radical, 
vied for the elimination of private property for the emancipation of the 
proletariat, a term that is inherently emotional. Keynes and Hayek also 
had their normative beliefs that shaped their dogma. Here, we see an ex-
ample of how reason and emotion are combined to create seemingly un-
movable paradigms. 
24  Sokolon, Political	Emotions, 4. 
25  Consider Antonio Damasio’s study on the effects of brain damage to the ventrome-
dial prefrontal region, the part of the brain associated with emotional response, more 
specifically, the area with the ability to think long-term and follow social rules (Sokolon, 
41). If this area fails to function normally, then one would behave in a socially unaccept-
able way. Decision-making is thus impeded as optimal decisions can no longer be made.
26  Sokolon, Political Emotions, 13. 
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Keynes’ career was renowned for his foresight and his proclivity for 
choosing the lesser of two evils. After World War I, he objected to the 
Versailles Treaty. In his book The Economic Consequences of Peace (1919), 
he argues large-scale reparations would harm Germany. He knew that 
the treaty would spawn greater discord. It is in this pragmatic orientation 
that Keynes wrote the General	Theory	of	Employment,	Interest	and	Money 
(1936). Prior to these tumultuous times, laissez faire economics were the 
dominant prescriptions.27 After the Great Depression of 1929, it became 
clear to Keynes that the laissez-faire system had its faults. To Keynes, the 
goal was to create a managed form of capitalism to ensure stability. In 
“The End of Laissez-faire” he writes:
Many people, who are really objecting to capitalism as a way of life, 
argue as though they were objecting to it on the grounds of its in-
efficiency in attaining its own goals…Nevertheless, a time may be 
coming when we shall get clearer than at present as to when we are 
talking about capitalism as an efficient or inefficient technique, and 
when we are talking about it as desirable or objectionable in itself. 
For my part I think capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be 
made more efficient for attaining economic ends than any alternati-
ve system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in many ways extremely 
objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organization 
which shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions 
of a satisfactory way of life.28
Here, Keynes wanted to create a more stable and sustainable form of cap-
italism that was not subject to drastic and unexpected booms and busts 
27  This meant that the government was to take a ‘hands off ’ approach; let the free mar-
ket lead and this would benefit humanity. This idea was forwarded by Adam Smith. He 
professed that only unregulated economic markets are the most efficient; government 
had no role to play in business and the production of goods and services. Smith argues: 
“Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest 
barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest 
being brought about by the natural course of things.” The government had to create the 
atmosphere for investment and let individual self-interest flow. This self-interest is the 
major contributor to this efficiency. If everyone produced what they knew best then this 
was beneficial for the community. Smith continues: “it is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer and the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest.”
28  John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (London: MacMillan, 1926), 293. 
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cycles that would lead persons to turn to radical political alternatives, like 
Communism. Ultimately, Keynes argues that since the world suffered 
from the unfettered market, it was the duty of governments to step in and 
create full employment. Full employment brings about a content popula-
tion and would ultimately discourage alternative movements. Keynesian-
ism became acceptable because the Soviet Union had full employment, 
a strong working class and a stable economy; three attributes a Liberal 
Economy lacked during long periods of depression. Thus, Keynesianism 
was a compromise to maintain a western liberal economic society to pre-
vent the spread of communism.29 Thus, he wrote his general theory with 
this purpose in mind:
The purpose of the book as a whole may be described as the establi-
shment of an anti-Marxian socialism, a reaction against laissez-fai-
re built on theoretical foundations totally unlike those of Marx in 
being based on a repudiation instead of on an acceptance of the 
classical hypotheses, and on an unfettering of competition instead 
of its abolition.30 
As can be seen here, Keynes’ ultimate desire was to create a more sustain-
able form of capitalism, one that was friendly to the acquisition of wealth 
for the benefit of society. His theories came from his ethical, political 
ideological commitments, driven by an expressed fear of communism, to 
make capitalism better against this alternative. Hayek saw this as inher-
ently bad and responded to Keynes with his own work.
The Road to Serfdom (1944) describes the normative underpinnings of 
Hayek. His life experiences dictated his opinion on Keynesianism and 
other forms of central planning. He writes on the dangers of following 
such policies knowing the potential for history to repeat itself: 
The author has spent about half of his adult life in his native Aus-
tria, in close touch with German intellectual life, and the other half 
in the United States and England. In the dozen years in which this 
country has now become his home he has become increasingly con-
vinced that at least some of the forces which have destroyed free-
29  John Maynard Keynes, The	General	Theory	of	Employment,	Interest	and	Money	(Pal-
grave Macmillan, 1936), 384.
30  Keynes, The General Theory, 355. 
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dom in Germany are also at work here, and that the character and 
the source of this danger are, if possible, even less understood than 
they were in Germany. The supreme tragedy is still not seen that in 
Germany it was largely people of goodwill, men who were admired 
and held up as models in this country, who prepared the way, if they 
did not actually create, the forces which now stand for everything 
they detest.31
According to Hayek, the dangers of sliding into totalitarianism were not 
unique to Fascism and Nazism, but rather to any attempt to place central-
ized authority into the hands of a few. He writes:
Few are ready to recognise that the rise of Fascism and Nazism was 
not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period, 
but a necessary outcome of those tendencies. This is a truth which 
most people were unwilling to see even when the similarities of 
many of the repellent features of the internal regimes in communist 
Russia and national-socialist Germany were widely recognised. As 
a result, many who think themselves infinitely superior to the abe-
rrations of Nazism and sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at 
the same time for ideals whose realisation would lead straight to the 
abhorred tyranny.32
This quote establishes Hayek’s normative motivation driven by the emo-
tion of fear: that both Fascism and Nazism were not born as a response to 
socialism, but because of a fundamental authoritarian nature predicated 
by the need to control. Those who purport any form of centralized plan-
ning would therefore undercut man’s natural right to govern. The poten-
tial for tyranny is too great; the distance from a democratic government 
toward authoritarian government is not a great one. He continues further:
Have not the parties of the Left as well as those of the Right been 
deceived by believing that the National Socialist Party was in the 
service of the capitalists and opposed to all forms of socialism? How 
many features of Hitler’s system have not been recommended to us 
for imitation from the most unexpected quarters, unaware that they 
are an integral part of that system and incompatible with the free 
31  F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3. 
32  Hayek, Road, 4. 
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society we hope to preserve? The number of dangerous mistakes we 
have made before and since the outbreak of war because we do not 
understand the opponent with whom we are faced is appalling. It 
seems almost as if we did not want to understand the development 
which has produced totalitarianism because such an understanding 
might destroy some of the dearest illusions to which we are deter-
mined to cling.33
To Hayek, centralized planning is fundamentally discordant with a free 
and democratic society. Too much power would be placed in the hands of 
the few. Thus, any attempt to pursue the Keynesian way would essentially 
lead to the dissolution of the society many seek to preserve through gov-
ernment intervention. Hence, Hayek responds to Keynes not simply in a 
positivist way, but rather, through the acknowledgement of a normative 
foundation that must not be denied.  
From these examples, we see how reason and emotional aspects of our 
being interact and work together to create and establish ideas and para-
digms. This provides firm ground for our hypotheses and the reasons for 
Sticky Paradigms in economics. Economics is quite the emotional subject. 
Who gets what is a very emotional task as there will always be winners 
and losers to every economic decision due to scarcity. The next section 
will discuss the Freudian concept of the ego and its role in the inflexibility 
of intellectualism. Emotion creates ideas and ego continues the dialectic. 
Ultimately, these two intellectuals were stubborn, not solely because of 
their positivist conviction, but because their inherently different, morally 
based positions, desired to prevent a greater evil combined with ego. Ac-
ademics may die but ideas never die; and academics stick to their guns.
Sticky Paradigms Defined
So far, this argument illustrates how ideas are created as a product of emo-
tion and reason. However, how does a paradigm stick? The ego plays a 
substantial role as part of the emotional institution in hindering paradigm 
shifts. Here, we introduce the subject of psychoanalysis.
Using the structural model of the mind theory of Sigmund Freud, we will 
discuss how ideas are developed in the mind. This will be done using his 
33  Hayek, Road, 6. 
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holistic theory of psychic structure that makes up the human mind.34 There 
are three parts to this theory: the id, the ego and the superego. The id is 
the unconscious and the instinctual; that which what is programmed with-
in us from since birth35 It is a primitive aspect of the psyche that consists 
of aggressive and sexual, animalistic behavior.36 It forms the mechanism 
for self-preservation and motivation. The ego and the superego are part-
ly conscious.37 The ego has a multiplicity of functions that involve rational 
thought, for example, perceptions, cognition, judgment and decision-mak-
ing. It forms a bridge between the internal, our mind, and the external, the 
world and between the id and the superego.38 It is developed by experiences 
with the outside world. Thus, the ego mediates between the unconscious 
and the conscious.39 The superego forms the moral base of this tripartite 
theory and acts as a check on the id, ensuring that we behave in a socially 
acceptable manner. It places a demand upon the ego to act, not solely in a 
rational way, but in an empathetic and moral way.40 With this structural 
model of the mind, how does this structure create ideas? Further, how does 
this relate to our main hypothesis, how emotion and reason create ideas?
To answer these questions, is it important to note that these three facets, 
the id, the ego and the superego, all make up the fundamental structure of 
the human mind. From our study, we submit that human behavior is reg-
ulated by this structure. Therefore, it is logical to argue that this structure 
governs human thought and rationality. To repeat, the human mind sits 
in the middle of a biological need to self-preserve (the id) and a simulta-
neous need to be acceptable to society (the superego). The ego stands in 
between these two, forming a compromise. The intellectual, if we assume 
he is human, is subject to these same anchors. Fundamentally, his or her 
ideas are formulated by the id and the superego, the need to self-preserve 
34  Gertrude Blanck and Rubin Blanck, Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 12.
35  Blanck and Blanck, Ego Psychology, 5.  
36  Jacob A. Arlow, “The Structural Model,” in Textbook of Psychoanalysis, ed. Richard G. 
Kopff and Edward Nersessian (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996), 63.  
37  Blanck and Blanck, Ego Psychology, 5.
38  Arlow, “Structural Model,” 61. 
39  Stephen Frosh, A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 73.
40  Frosh, Brief Introduction, 74. 
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and the need to be acceptable to society. Hence, ideas are articulated by 
these forces. Both Keynes and Hayek wanted to create a theory to preserve 
what they thought was a good society. They also wanted their ideas to 
flourish and become popular, or as Machiavelli would say, “have the ear of 
the Prince.” They expressed this need through their training: Economics. 
Moreover, it is important to analyze how they react to those that accept 
and reject their intellectuality. Since the ego is developed by the interac-
tion between the id and the superego, then it will be impacted by outside 
criticism. In turn, the ego, with the id and superego would respond. First, 
focusing on the id, the unconscious part of the psyche is always active, 
perpetually seeking satisfaction.41 This forms the crux of self-protection, 
the basic and automatic response to a threat.42 Many psychoanalysts deal 
with internal threats, a traumatic memory for example. Instead, I would 
like to focus on outside threats, such as the replacement of paradigms. 
No scholar would like to see their paradigm destroyed for some other 
equation which is why scholars defend their positions vociferously. Here, 
we must focus on the emotional attachment to that paradigm, instead of 
the paradigm itself. The ego’s defense mechanisms protect the paradigm 
from destruction. The ego has the ability to find solutions to attack which 
explains the stickiness of paradigms. This has been illustrated in the be-
ginning of this paper with the discussion of continued and simultaneous 
existence of certain schools of economic thought or paradigms. 
Heinz Hartmann goes into greater detail. He purports that the ego pos-
sesses elements such as defense and adaptation especially since it has to 
reconcile the needs of the id with the needs of the superego.43 Focusing on 
defense, the ego has the ability to respond to attack. Using its capability to 
rationalize, the ego can find a plethora of solutions to these attacks. Thus, 
the ego, the part of the mind that rationalizes, will use its power to give 
reason for the failure of the paradigm. It will find the evidence it needs to 
prevent the paradigm from sinking into a perceived oblivion, fulfilling the 
superego’s need to become socially acceptable again.  
41  Frosh, Brief Introduction, 9. 
42  Frosh, Brief Introduction, 56. 
43  Blanck and Blanck, Ego Psychology, 19. 
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This Freudian investigation is interested in the dark recesses of the mind. 
Every man, woman and child in existence is subjected to their personality 
and within that personality lays this very structure. This structure impacts 
the way a person thinks and functions in society and also in academia. 
Academics, contrary to their self-perception, are just like everyone else. 
Moreover, there are no methodologies that exist today that can separate 
the individual from their psyche. This line of thought is related to the 
Neo-Gramscian assumption that dictates that: “No one has ever devised 
a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from 
the fact of his involvement with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, 
or from the mere activity of being a member of society”.44 
Hegel’s Dialectic in Explaining Sticky Paradigms
In the previous sections, we have employed examples jointly with an Ar-
istotelian framework on human emotion and a Freudian investigation 
on mind structure. In this last part, we contrive to synthesize our anal-
yses into a philosophical “super-structure”, using the logic of idealistic 
dialectic.  
German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel, in his works on the science of 
logic as part of the 1830 Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science intro-
duced a comprehensive architecture to accommodate the developments 
of science, art, history, religion, and even our existence in the universe. 
Based on Hegel’s reasoning, contradictions and oppositions are inherent 
to people’s minds: these tensions coexist by proving each other wrong in 
the negation of negation and together they constitute Hegel’s essential 
thinking of dialectic. Hegel defined his idealist dialectic: 
In its true and proper character, Dialectic is the very nature and 
essence of everything predicated by the mere understanding--- the 
law of things and of the finite as a whole… by Dialectic is meant 
the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and 
limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen as in its true 
light, and shown to be the negation of them.45 
44  Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978), 10. 
45  William Wallace, Hegel’s Philosophy of mind / Tr. from the Encyclopaedia of the philo-
sophical	sciences,	with	five	introductory	essays (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), 116. 
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In other words, Hegel saw everything surrounding us as an instance of Di-
alectic, which constantly transforms into its opposite. Everything has two 
sides: positive and negative; they are united and made part of its nature. 
For example, in Hegel’s view, living and dying are two interchangeable 
forms of life; being and nothing are integrated as becoming; extreme an-
archy and extreme despotism naturally lead to one another.
Hegel further constructed a three-step model of development to explain 
the indefinite nature of everything: the emergence of a thesis will auto-
matically give rise to an antithesis; tensions between the thesis and the 
antithesis are resolved into a synthesis.  To shed light on the evolution of 
science, such a synthesis signifies the existence of a discipline while both 
the thesis and the antithesis are differing schools or paradigms within the 
discipline. To emphasize, Hegel stressed that the development of a true 
science should be cumulative, dialectical and ultimately infinite:
An infinite system of true propositions free of logical contradiction 
(a comprehensive consistent system of knowledge) is approached 
by logically contradictory statements in the world. In part by such 
contradiction in the history of knowledge, such science is gradua-
lly, dialectically constructed. The systematic truth is essentially a 
result.46
Moreover, through the Doctrine of Dialectic, Hegel in fact conveyed the 
thought of “negation of the negation” as the center of infinite thinking. 
The underlying logic is: the one side of a science is an indirect proof whose 
contradictoriness implies the truth of the negative side and vice versa. To 
connect this logic to Hegelian dialectic, one can argue: “The notion of 
the infinite is the negation of the negation, affirmation, being which has 
restored itself out of limitedness… It is the very nature of the finite to 
transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite”.47 
Various schools of economic thought, acting as relational parts are inte-
grated into the whole of Economics, as a general field of inquiry. Keynes’ 
46  Clark Butler, Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and History (Evanston, Illinois: North-
western University Press, 1996), 70-1. 
47  John N. Findlay, “Comment on Hegel’s Dialectic of the Organic Whole,” in Art and 
Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy, ed. Warren Steinkraus and Kenneth Schmitz (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1980),267.
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avocation of government intervention co-exists with Hayek’s claim for 
free market economy in a dialectical way without eliminating each pole. 
It has the potential to consider the existence of emotion and the ego as it 
creates room for negotiation as represented by synthesis. Moreover, emo-
tion and reason work in unity by negating or invalidating one another 
in the fashion of negation of the negation. Together, they constitute the 
mental basis of intellectual self-soothing. 
Further, the ego operates in-tandem with the id and the superego to ex-
plain our attachment to ideas. Intellectualism and paradigms are unable 
to change or shift because of the structure of the human psyche. It is in 
this sense that academic exercises, such as this one, cannot be considered 
pure science; being human erodes this. Paradigms are not simply an ob-
jective theory created by the rational individual. The idea is contaminated 
by the very mind that conceived it. This is because of the psyche. There-
fore, human beings are not quite the rational beings. Rather, ‘rationality’ 
must be seen as an equation that includes not simply reason, but the id 
and the superego. Our primal instincts combined with our need to be ac-
ceptable to society will inevitably destroy the very idea we hope to convey. 
Thus, combining reason with emotion, paradigms become mythical. 
Myths are constructed to “inspire people to act and create reality”.48 Ac-
cording to George Sorel, Marxism, for example is a myth in that it does 
not have to be factual: it simply serves as a rallying cry to convince the 
working class to act. Myths need not be rooted in truth, only emotion; 
they are not “descriptions of things, but determinations to act”.49 Since 
emotion is involved, myths cannot be easily destroyed. Sorel illustrates 
this: “A myth cannot be refuted, since it is, at bottom, identical with the 
convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the 
language of movement…”50 Here, politics and struggle are not based upon 
fact or rationality, but are instead rooted in terms of emotion and lies 
for the purpose of survival. A scholar’s determination to preserve his/her 
ideas emerges from a need to be accepted by the academic community. 
This is the philosophical essence of Sticky Paradigms. It provides a more 
48  Carl Cohen, Communism,	 Fascism	 and	 Democracy:	The	Theoretical	 Foundations 
(New York: Random House, 1967), 320. 
49  Cohen, Communism, 320.
50  Cohen, Communism, 324. 
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profound explanation for the existence of multiple paradigms. Economic 
theories are thus formed; it is the mythos of academia.
Through our careful examination on the relationship between and among 
different paradigms in the history of Economics, we notice that the hy-
pothesis of paradigm shifts does not hold for the development of social 
science; instead, “old” paradigms stick via the normative commitment as 
well as the psychological persistence of the great minds behind them.        
Conclusion
We are puzzled by a big question: what explains progress in social science? 
Taking on the science of Economics, we hypothesize that it is emotion that 
renders a multiplicity of paradigms in harmony with each other. In order 
to validate our hypothesis, we approach the research question with a hier-
archical structure of four layers.  Firstly, we document a historical review 
of the evolution of economics from Smith to Friedman, with emphases on 
the works of Keynes and Hayek, as two representing paradigms. In doing 
so, we demonstrate both intellectually and empirically that different par-
adigms operate in parallel simultaneously, rather than at different times. 
On one hand, not a single school of thought can occupy the whole of 
Economics, even at its height of dominance. On the other hand, different 
paradigms are often used in cooperation to explain complex real-world 
events, such as financial instability and economic governance.  
Secondly, we follow Aristotle’s reasoning on emotion and reason to ex-
plain the persistence of different paradigms at one time in Economics, 
both aimed at improving capitalism. Keynes and Hayek grounded their 
ideas in differing normative orientations based on their personal experi-
ence. Struck by the miseries of the Great Depression and worries about 
the advent of communism, Keynes decided that proper government inter-
vention is necessary to save capitalism from self-destruction; while bur-
dened by a centralized economy and troubled by its tendency to lead to 
authoritarian control, Hayek insisted that a free economy is essential to a 
free society.  In both cases, emotion, in close relation with reason accounts 
for their different gestures.
Thirdly, we utilize the structural theory of Sigmund Freud to define the in-
ertia of paradigms.  Specifically, the id-ego-superego framework is used to 
Sticky paradigms in Social Science: 
The role of emotion and ego in the case of economics
Perspectivas Internacionales178
illustrate why paradigms do not shift in a clear fashion. It is the normative 
commitment of each representing scholar to making the capitalist economy 
better that constitutes sticky paradigms. Additionally, the inability to shift 
also emerges from scholars’ personal attachments to their theories.
Lastly, we distil our analyses with a philosophical focus. Hegelian dialec-
tic is applied to our hypothesis of sticky paradigms. Economics, as every 
other science, is an infinite essence of being that is made up of opposing 
parts, and thus is dialectically constructed. Economics, or broadly social 
science, manifests itself in a set of contradictions, but it ultimately inte-
grates without reducing one to the other.  
Certainly, the intellectual history of social science is far from closed. Our 
project serves as a detailed account of the complexity and sophistication 
of social science. As scholars, we cannot be free from all worldly weights, 
demands, requirements, and pressures. However, we must attempt to fully 
pursue creative, innovation and unconventional thinking. 
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